Interfaith Theologian

Saturday, December 6, 2014

Leviticus 18, Incest and the Problems of Translation in Rabbinic Law

             One of the stranger translation problems I ran into this week was the rabbinic prohibition of arayot (literally nakedness) and how it refers to the Holiness Code found in Leviticus 18. In a number of instances in which I found the word translated in this context into English, the preference was “incest.” The word incest carries with it a very specific meaning in English. One dictionary defines it as “sexual intercourse between closely related persons.” While more than a few of the examples found in Leviticus 18 can be described as the sin of incest, Leviticus also covers bestiality, homosexuality, and adultery.

One such example of the use of incest alone comes from the post-Talmudic Shulhan Arukh, a source of legal administration in the medieval ages by Rabbi Joseph Karo. It is an important document in establishing the development of rabbinic thinking, but it translates the arayot (at least in the translation I found) differently. The passage below what is known in Rabbinic Judaism as the principle of pikuach nefesh (saving a life), and it suggests three sins for which there is no escape. Once violated, these sins require that a Torah-observant Jew give his life.

A person should permit himself to be killed rather than violate a negative commandment in public or because of religious coercion, or rather than commit murder, fornication, or idolatry. A person may not save his life at the cost of another person's, but he may save his life by deception.

The more popular translation is simply incest, replaced here with fornication. You can find this in a variety of places, including Rambam’s long explanation on pikuach nefesh in which he describes the second sin as “incest.” Now while a conversation I had with a rabbi on the problem of translation here only revealed that incest is a compensatory word meant to cover all sexually illicit conduct found in Leviticus 18, others, like Emil Fackenheim, the great German-American rabbi of the previous century, suggested that incest was a “family matter.” Referring to the principle of pikuach nefesh, he writes:

“Why incest? The authorities seem unanimous about the fact but not the reason; but it may be surmised that incest destroys the family, that Israel begins as a family and in a sense always remains a family, and that its witness to the nations includes the sanctity of family life.”[1]

So given that incest is tantamount to familial intercourse, Fackenheim does little to extend that definition to include adultery, male homosexuality, or bestiality. But why? The rabbi then asked me why pre-martial sex was not included in this list because that surely had to be a sin. But this brings us to the very problem Fackenheim recognizes. The reason why incest is chosen is not at all clear, if the implication is why not these others? Then we have an example in which the arayot of Leviticus 18 as a cover-all term for at least three varieties of sexual sin may not be the best translation, but simply the sin of incest.

Perhaps Fackenheim did not think these other sins affected the “family structure.” Now it becomes a little dicey when Fackenheim concludes that it is because Israel is a family that incest is wrong. Following this logic, one could argue that any sex would therefore be wrong (even married sex) because it would be done within the confines of Israel and certainly Fackenheim is not prescribing mixed marriages here as the answers.

Therefore, I can’t help but believe he means literal incest here. An approach that tries to square this up with arayot has to explain the insufficiency of the explanation to capture homosexuality, adultery, and bestiality as the only types of sin that ruin the family, when Fackenheim’s own description of Israel as a family would also make sex within marriage wrong.  While Incest (depending upon impregnation) destroys the genetic sanctity of the family, and adultery (depending upon impregnation) destroys the moral sanctity of the family, bestiality and male homosexuality at best destroy the perception of wholesomeness. Pre-martial sex on the other hand, not mentioned as arayot, cannot destroy any perception of family since no family is implied.

Still, it strikes me as a sloppiness that needs to be remedied, especially among American Jewish thinkers who continue to use incest where they mean arayot, a description that encompasses much more. The only thing I can find similar where I encounter the frustrations typical of a former English major, though not as morally egregious, is the translation from Hebrew texts to English ones where the word people is used. The ha’am of the Hebrew is a singular noun, but in English it is usually a plural in subject-verb predication. Yet, you see instances time and again where the translation is not things such as “The people of Israel is a community.” Or “I have seen how my people responds to such allegations.” The same rabbi suggested that the people here may be referring to the collective consciousness and so should be rendered singularly, but I find this a difficult proposition to accept, especially since the contexts in which I see these written do not suggest mystical or figurative understandings that require enhancements.

So while love may cover a multitude of sins, I’m not sure incest does.




[1] What is Judaism? P. 139

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