Eric Metaxas’ recent hosting duties on Break Point, a conservative radio show founded by the late Chuck Colson, allowed him the opportunity to give yet another public interpretation on Bonhoeffer extolling the conservative virtues of the famous theologian. Like his National Prayer Breakfast appearance in March 2012, in which he raised his arms triumphantly to declare the coming together of right and left as a “Bonhoeffer moment,” in his latest foray, the always dapper Metaxas revisits a position, which he believes endears the 20th century theologian to his own religious crusade: Bonhoeffer’s staunch opposition to abortion.
Before I begin, it should be noted that Metaxas’ work and expertise is not in the theology of Bonhoeffer, neither is his grasp of German or Continental theology of a scholarly nature, but comes as a journalist who is indebted to the important biographical work by Eberhard Bethge. In speaking with an acquaintance at Union Theological Seminary (a place of importance in Bonhoeffer’s theological career where the theological cult of Bonhoeffer still thrives), he asked the question why Metaxas’ felt the need to write another biography when we have good information already. I’ve asked myself the same question since there is absolutely nothing new in the field of scholarship that Metaxas brings. What is fresh is his bungled interpretation of Bonhoeffer. Certainly, there’s some motivation, especially where Metaxas’ conservative slant finds expression in the territory already covered, but it cannot be explored here.
Metaxas’ biography on Bonhoeffer is staggeringly popular. Since January 2013, there are close to 700 individuals who have rated the book on Amazon and that’s only those who have chosen or cared to respond. Most of the reviews are favorable, which leads me to believe there are a lot of people reading it and walking away affirming what they already sensed about Bonhoeffer in their Sunday school readings, but in a much more dynamic context. While Metaxas exploits Bonhoeffer on his Facebook page with the joie de vivre of a rock star, advertising his 10 city tour of Bonhoeffer, where his schedule is filled by conservative churches and other politically motivated groups, the book has been heavily criticized by lesser known Bonhoeffer scholars and academics, and most lay readers are not reading their technical treatments en masse to get a sense of what these men who have invested their lives, rather than invest their time in a contract from Tommy Nelson, around this interesting person.
Unlike Bethge, who himself admitted his hesitation in interpreting the legacy of his friend, instead opting to allow others to do such work, Metaxas has little trouble summoning Bonhoeffer to the defense of some hot button issues that panic conservatives (I note for example an article from 2010 on Hitler’s Germany in which he compares the Reich’s program of Gleichschaltung to the repression of religion in our country).
During his Break Point broadcast, Metaxas wastes no time positioning Bonhoeffer as an opponent of abortion. I found it interesting that along with Metaxas’ own vocal opposition to abortion, his wife’s duties include “running the Midtown Pregnancy Support Center” in New York. Thus, abortion is serious business in the Metaxas’ household, so it’s a good thing they have an ideologue like Bonhoeffer to bear some of the intellectual responsibility.
After spending a short time discussing the ongoing abortion issue in religious and secular culture, he suddenly introduces Bonhoeffer as a conversation partner, notifying his listeners that it is without a doubt that Bonhoeffer believed abortion to be “evil.”
He goes on to quote from Bonhoeffer’s unfinished work on Ethics in support of this position, on the grounds that the fetus has a right to life. And so he quotes the following:
“Destruction of the embryo in the mother’s womb is a violation of the right to live which God has bestowed upon this nascent life.”
The passage above comes from “The Natural Life,” one of a number of manuscripts that were written independently over the course of three years and during his time at the Roman Catholic Ettal Abbey, later to be combined posthumously into the composition we know today as Ethics.
The first item of importance is that Metaxas’ uses the 1995 English edition, an older edition that in Bonhoeffer scholarship is known for its absence of an important passage, and what I believe is a clue that fleshes out the larger picture of Bonhoeffer’s view on abortion.
In the current authoritative edition of Ethics in the Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works collection, the translation provided above is notably different:
“To kill the fruit in the mother’s womb is to injure the right to life that God has bestowed on the developing life.”
Of the obvious differences in translation, one might first note that between the two passages, the embryo, something on its way to viability is called fruit, destruction becomes killing, and the right to live, which treats rights as something inherent to the embryo’s own project, becomes the right to life, a change that creates a more conceptual appeal.
Equally interesting is the move from “violation” to “injury.” The German word here is verletzen.
While in some instances the word can be translated as violation, its most common usage translates “to injure.” The late Neville Horton Smith, who was responsible for the 1995 translation which Metaxas’ uses, to my knowledge left no justification for his translation. His rejection therefore of the more common usage “to injure” may be tied up with its implication of impermanency, and therefore seems equally awkward considering that Bonhoeffer follows by claiming that this violation is “nothing but murder,” an act that implies permanency. Perhaps, this translation decision can be blamed on an instinctual thought process that denies the same qualitative force to injury and murder.
The word “violation” enjoys a certain attractiveness that is undeniable, especially when one considers that at least two uses of the Greek word for sin parabasis and asebeia suggest violation, and a third term parabaino was used in cases in which a soldier directly violates a command from his superior. From here, it is only a short inference to evil for the modern evangelical mind. Violation is such a part of the traditional Western cultural concept of sin that qualifying the violation as evil has maintained a prominent place in the tradition.
The problem is that for Bonhoeffer evil (Böse) does not occupy the same conceptual ground as it does in the greater Protestant tradition. When Bonhoeffer speaks in Ethics of evil, the references usually do not speak to the overcoming of some ultimate abstract evil or mythic Satan figure that stands in direct opposition to God, but to the overcoming of socially accepted systems of ethics in which good and evil become inaccurate frames of reference to Christ, primarily because situations arise in which no true consensus of right or wrong can occur given their historical considerations, or the dilemmas which social ethical systems attempt to address become exacerbated by internal contradiction, the very baseline of crisis theology. In Bonhoeffer studies, this is widely acknowledged in the use of contextualism and concretion, two themes that persist throughout the wider body of literature.
This is extraordinarily problematic for those like Metaxas who attempt to consign Bonhoeffer to positions of good and evil, which are then spun off entirely independent of the divine reality from which they are supposed to derive (one outcome for example are atheists who take up the call to justice without particular reference to any divine command theory). A pronouncement that at all times and in all circumstances an act is concomitant to the violation of the right to live as sin comes dangerously close to the kind of moral absolutism that no longer requires the revelation of God through Christ for its vitality. To paraphrase Bonhoeffer’s interpreter Ernst Feil, general principles do not give us access to reality. It is precisely for this reason that Bonhoeffer calls Christian ethics to the person of Christ rather than to new laws that proceed from him. To put it plainly, Bonhoeffer is no deontological ethicist, and violations cannot be posed as deviations from abstract divine laws. Unfortunately, the language of “violation” suggests this very thing, and creates the kind of misunderstanding for which Metaxas is to be blamed.
How does violation than operate within the context of the larger passage? If violation is the correct translation solely on the grounds that rights are tied into Bonhoeffer’s concept of humanity (and one would argue that the intended end of the fetus is humanity), the same who reads the section in its entirety would be hard pressed to understand why Bonhoeffer’s logic here fails to harmonize the conditions given with humanity through marriage as it does with the fetus. On the one hand, the right to life, which is first presupposed in marriage, is not conditioned by biology, but rather is simply given in one’s participatory existence, i.e., in one’s being human. Yet, when Bonhoeffer speaks of the fetus, it seems a reasonable presumption that he must be defending a biological understanding of rights since no fetus can choose life for itself. The idea of choosing has a much more prominent place in the tradition in defining what it means to be human than does biology. What clue do we have that Bonhoeffer might reject a biological basis for doing theology?
Bonhoeffer seems to give some insight for possible interpretative filters here. In his early work Sanctorum Communio, Bonhoeffer writes about the biological basis of sin. He argues that this understanding creates incompatibles, inequities between various peoples (infants, mentally deficient, etc.) and ethical indifferent views. We therefore cannot start with biology as the basis through which we define sin. Rather we must define humanity through a collective view of sin, which he calls culpability (DBWE 1:114). Likewise, one might say that biology is not the starting point for understanding what it means to be human, but rather the rights which God intends.
Nevertheless, Bonhoeffer notes that the question of whether this fetus is human or not is wrong-headed, for the real question is what God intends. At this point, it might appear that Bonhoeffer has spoken ex cathedra, that our particular method of success need not matter much, since regardless of whether biology or God originates the right to life, the rights of the fetus are carried with its biology, and therefore we reach the same conclusion. Immediately following this section where Bonhoeffer locates the question of humanity in God’s intention, he goes on to speak about the desperate circumstances that lead some to agree to such actions. In one particular case, he mentions the Roman Catholic practice of saving the fetus even while the mother’s life is in danger. Here, for the first time, viability is brought into relief. And so any question of whether Bonhoeffer is suggesting an absolute rejection of abortion is once again reshaped within the context of these circumstances.
In the years since Bonhoeffer, viability has been redefined primarily because of advances in technology. A point similar to this actually serves to show how Bonhoeffer is not an absolutist. For example, he engages the Roman Catholic moral prohibition on contraception as a sociological critique, noting the technological developments which have made the social need for large families a thing of the past due to diminishing infant mortality rates. Better than his interpreters, Bonhoeffer avoids absolute ethical stands.
Lacking in Metaxas’ version of Ethics is a particularly poignant passage found in the German edition and was only recovered in the latest edition, in which Bonhoeffer offers an example of a mother who has to make a difficult decision against her own nature to abort her child and must take on the guilt of that decision. The question of course becomes what does Bonhoeffer mean by guilt, and does guilt imply wrong-doing? We certainly know from the broader context of the Ethics that anyone who will act responsibly, regardless of outcome, must take on guilt. Guilt in Ethics, is a sophisticated topic. I would argue it carries with it similar characteristics of culpability as expressed in Sanctorum Communio, in that both must first be interpreted as a collective activity. The similarities also resonate in his own biography, as Bonhoeffer’s act of treason against Hitler, in which a small conspiratorial circle acted for what they believed was their nation (most of whom considered them traitors). Bonhoeffer addresses this topic indirectly in the Ethics, in which the hard decisions we take on ourselves are done responsibly, and we do so with the community in mind. Bonhoeffer does indeed note here that the community ought to take on guilt too. But guilt in Ethics is a continual standing in the place of the Other, one which guilt is not confined to an expression of personal sorrow or remorse. Guilt, for Bonhoeffer is “standing in place of,” just as Christ did so for us (Stellvertretung). Bonhoeffer scholar Larry Rasmussen has pointed to the particular difficulty here; especially since he believes Bonhoeffer does not satisfactorily distinguish between sins in which we are truly guilty and the taking on of guilt as an act of Christian vocation. Regardless, Metaxas should not assume acts of guilt refer to the former, as the evidence in the Ethics abundantly rejects this interpretation. This unfortunately is another topic for another time.
This passage concerning the mother also comes on the heels of one in which Bonhoeffer speaks of the need for pastoral counseling in such situations. Metaxas’ senses Bonhoeffer’s more obvious tone here, and makes the rather simplistic observation that we should not judge the sinner even as we judge the sin, and to “think twice” about such things. This statement nearly bowled me over as it completely diminishes the acumen of this German scholar. On this precise point, John de Gruchy, a noted Bonhoeffer scholar, asserts that this parsing of the individual and action on the grounds of such a theological cliché, is rejected by Bonhoeffer. The Ethics speaks against attempts to divide the individual into spheres of action and cognition. The reason for this rejection is that this kind of division fosters irresponsibility as it treats the individual as an entity that can be separated from his actions. This theme is consistently met throughout his writings, in his early rejection of idealism, the Christological lectures of 1933, and down through Ethics. Yet what is important here, as it is throughout the broader context of these passages on abortion is that nowhere does Bonhoeffer relate, implicate, or qualify any action in which abortion is taken as inherent wrongdoing. Metaxas’ argument that abortion is evil is based upon a presupposition that “concepts” like murder, guilt, and violation are already decided in Bonhoeffer’s theological vocabulary. A larger view of the development of murder and guilt do not bear this out, while the word “violation” in my opinion is the wrong translation.
But we have yet to look at how “to injure” might work in our understanding of the offending passage. The trajectory of Bonhoeffer’s use of verletzen, while such an interpretation may seem foreign to a 21st century American Evangelical audience, is clearly not pointed at the fetus, but at the right to life that is given with humanity by God. Keeping in context the larger scope of the passage, the right to life is therefore located and originates with God. Just a few sentences prior, Bonhoeffer makes this point by indicating that rights are not in our hands, but are given by God with each individual. But how then might one injure a right given by God?
It may be that the translation “to injure” implies an unsuccessful attack on God’s intentions. Where God intends humanity through Christ, one ought not to oppose this by acting in a way contrary. In this way, it is true that injury does not produce a permanent effect because despite what we do, even if it brings us to murder, God intentions are not earthbound but eternal.
But furthermore, it should not go unnoticed that this section is developed alongside Bonhoeffer’s concept of Responsibility (Verantwortung). Responsible action for Bonhoeffer is of a kind that takes into itself both the entire individual and his entire relationship with Christ within a given context. This is why on the issue of procreation, Bonhoeffer rejects blind impulse. Every action must be confronted reflectively, thoughtfully, and the direction of these orientations must be within Christ. Of course to be “in Christ” is very different from being in some mandate given by Christ. Bonhoeffer rejects social ethical constructs that seek to import Christian ideals at the expense of losing the lawgiver in the process. It is the living, breathing, dynamic relationship that is constantly repristinated in the context. This would also mean, and quite rightly I believe, the sin-as-violation interpretation that is so important to American evangelicalism was not an interpretative possibility for Bonhoeffer, if we hold to the logic of the rest of the section in which biology is never an argument for human rights.
Finally, there is one more thing to consider, and that is historical context. When one consigns Bonhoeffer to a thoroughgoing right-to-life campaign, I think it is only sound when it is accomplished within the context for the kind of compulsory activity in the Germany of his day, not as a general application that judges all abortion as sin. Even if we concede here that abortion was a violation of the right to life of the fetus, we must consider that it is a right to life that Bonhoeffer saw compromised by the compulsory efforts to abortion in which the State was culprit and infringing upon the rights of the individual. This is the context for Bonhoeffer’s comments. In our day and age, the situation is quite different. There are no compulsory orders (although circumstances such as economic hardship certainly have the force of compulsion). Rather, it is just the opposite. Freedom of choice is at issue. Bonhoeffer’s own interpretation of freedom never promotes a libertine freedom in which one is simply attempting to extricate himself from a tough situation. Freedom rather is always a freedom for responsibility, not from it. Those who bear the right to choice can only be responsible. Those who are already resigned to abstractions of divine law cannot be responsible for their actions because they are already always decided for them. When reading the section on abortion closely then, Metaxas’ dogmatized selections are correct insofar as they are read from those passages where Bonhoeffer appears to reject decisions to abort. The problem however is these are those instances where Bonhoeffer is critical of irresponsible action not abortion as an interminable evil. Metaxas simply does not filter the context from the broader section that allows for a more compelling reading, in which the concept of responsibility is more crucial than the act itself. I suspect this is why Metaxas reads Bonhoeffer’s call for pastoral counseling and guilt-sharing as a call for compassion and nothing more.
Like many of his American conservative evangelical pals, part of Metaxas’ symptomatic veneration of Bonhoeffer I believe is grasped by Stephen Plant’s diagnosis of the conservative infatuation with Bonhoeffer in general:
“Bonhoeffer’s rough contemporaries Paul Tillich, Rudolf Bultmann, and Karl Barth – are typically regarded by American evangelicals as something less than “true” believers whose theologies are all the more dangerous for their apparent orthodoxy. Yet today, when it is difficult to find a positive mention of any of these men in evangelical publications, Bonhoeffer (who had much in common with them and was a product of the same church and university systems) is honored by a broad array of evangelical authors, publications, and institutions.”
It is hard to summarize this strong attraction felt by many conservatives to Dietrich Bonhoeffer. One thing that remains is that Dietrich Bonhoeffer believed himself to have died for his faith. But even this, I would argue, did not mean that there was a heroic motif of confession involved. Rather, to call Bonhoeffer a martyr is an act that must be reserved for him individually since for Bonhoeffer to put a theological language to the worldview developing around him was most important. Because, he talked a lot about God and Jesus, and he died while talking about them, his faith “looked" meritorious and he became a figure worth venerating in conservative circles, because he paid the ultimate price. Certainly, if he were “liberal,” with their concessions to social order and cultivation of soft interpretations of Jesus, it would be a categorical mistake and existential impossibility to consider that one like Bonhoeffer who was entrenched in a tradition that had elements of these would actually have the conviction to die for his faith.
